This paper presents a decision-theoretic ap proach to statistical inference that satisfi es the Likelihood Principle (LP) without using prior information. Unlike the Bayesian ap proach, which also satisfies LP, we do not assume knowledge of the prior distribution of the unknown parameter. With respect to information that can be obtained from an ex periment, our solution is more efficient than Wald's minimax solution. However, with re spect to information assumed to be known before the experiment, our solution demands less input than the Bayesian solution.
Introduction
The Likelihood Principle (LP) is one of the funda mental principles of statistical inference [8, 5, 3, 2] . A statistical inference problem can be formulated as follows. We are given a description of an experiment in the form of a partially specified probability model that consists of a random variable Y which is as sumed to follow one of the distributions in the family :F = {PolO E !1}. The set of distributions is param eterized by (I whose space is !1. Suppose we observe Y = y, an outcome of the experiment. What can we conclude about the true value of the parameter (I?. Roughly speaking, LP holds that all relevant informa tion from the situation is encoded in the likelihood function on the parameter space. In practice, likeli hood information is used according to the maximum likelihood procedure (also refered to as the maximum likelihood principle or method) whereby the likelihood assigned to a set of hypotheses is often taken to be the maximum of the likelihoods of individual hypothesis in the set. The power and importance of this pro cedure in statistics is testified by the following quote from Lehman [14] :
Although the maximum likelihood principle is not based on any clearly defi ned optimum consideration, it has been very successful in leading to satisfactory procedures in many specific problems. For wide classes of prob lem, maximum likelihood procedure have also been shown to possess various asymptotic op timum properties as the sample size tends to infinity.
A major approach to statistical inference is the decision-theoretic approach in which the statistical in ference problem is viewed as a decision problem un der uncertainty. This view implies that every action taken about the unknown parameter has consequences depending on the true value of the parameter. For ex ample, in the context of an estimation problem, an action can be understood as the estimate of the pa rameter; or in the context of a hypothesis testing prob lem an action is a decision to a ccept or reject an hy pothesis. The consequences of actions are valued by their utility or loss. A solution to a decision problem is selected according to certain theories. Two widely used decision theories are Wald's minim a x and the expected utility maximization. The latter is appropri ate for Bayesian statistical problems in which there is sufficient information to describe the posterior proba bility distribution on the hypothesis space. Bayesian approach agrees with LP. It holds that the relevant information from the experiment is indeed contained in the likelihood function. However, in addition to the experimental data, Bayesian statistics assumes the ex istence of a prior probability distribution, which sum marizes the information about the unknown parameter before the experiment is conducted. This prior prob ability assumption is probably the most contentious topic in statistics.
In [10, 11] , we presented an axiomatic approach to de cision making where uncertainty about the true state of nature is expressed by a possibility function. Possi bility theory is a relatively recent calculus for describ-ing uncertainty. Possibility theory has been developed and used mostly within the AI community. It was first proposed in late 1970s by Zadeh [23] .
In this paper, we take the position of LP. In particular, we assume that likelihood information, as used in the maximum likelihood procedure, faithfully represents all relevant uncertainty about the unknown parame ter. We show that such information is a possibility measure. Thus, our decision theory for possibility cal culus is applicable to the problem of statistical infer ence. We argue that our approach satisfies LP. But, in contrast with the Bayesian approach, we do not as sume any knowledge of the prior distribution of the unknown parameter. We claim that our solution is more information efficient than Wald 's minimax solu tion, but demands less input than the Bayesian solu tion.
2

Likelihood Information and Possibility Function
Let us recall basic definitions in possibility theory. A possibility function is a mapping from the set of pos sible worlds S to the unit interval [0, 1]
wES Possibility for a subset A <;; S is defined as
wE A
A conditional possibility 1 is defined for A, B C S, 1r(A) f. 0
Compared to probability functions, the major differ ence is that the possibility of a set is the maximum of possibilities of elements in the set.
Given a probabilistic model :F and an observation y, we want to make inference about the unknown param eter e which is in space !1.
The likelihood concept used in modern statistics was coined by R. A. Fisher who mentioned it as early as 1922 [9] . Fisher used likelihood to measure the "men tal confidence" in competing scientific hypotheses as a result of a statistical experiment (see [8] for a detailed account). Likelihood has a puzzling nature. For a single value e0, the likelihood is just Pe0 (y), the prob ability of observing y if e0 is in fact the true value of the parameter. One can write Pe0(y) in the form of a conditional probability: P(Y = y[e = eo). The latter notation implies that there is a probability measure on parameter space !1. This is the case for the Bayesian approach. In this paper, we do not assume such a probability measure. So we will stick with the former notation. For each value e E !1, there is a likelihood quantity. If we view the set of likelihood quantities as a function on the parameter space, we have a likeli hood function. To emphasis the fact that a likelihood function is tied to data y and has e as the variable, the following notation is often used:
Thus, a likelihood function is determined by a partially specified probabilistic model and an observation. It is important to note that the likelihood function can no longer can be interpreted as a probability function. For example, integration (or summation) of the likelihood function over the parameter space, in general, does not sum up to unity.
The Likelihood Principle (LP) states that all informa tion about e that can be obtained from an observation y is contained in the likelihood function for e given y, up to a proportional constant. LP has two powerful supporting arguments [3] .
First, it is well known that likelihood function liky (e) is a minimal sufficient statistic for e. Thus, from the classical statistical point of view, the likelihood con tains all information about e. Second, Birnbaum, in a seminal article published in 1962 [4] , showed that the Likelihood Principle is logically equivalent to the combination of two fundamental principles in statis tics: the principle of conditionality and the principle of sufficiency. The principle of conditionality says that only the actual observation is relevant to the analysis and not those that potentially could be observed. where e is a maximum likelihood estimate of e.
The "extended" likelihood is not new. In fact, it was used by Neyman and Pearson in seminal papers pub lished in 1928 [18] where their famous hypothesis test-ing theory was presented. The idea is to use the max imum likelihood estimate as the proxy for a set. Such a procedure is not only intuitively appealing, but it is also backed by various asymptotic optimality proper ties [13, 15, 19] .
If in the process, one decides to focus on a particular subset of the parameter space B <;:: !1, the effect of refocusing on the extended likelihood function could be express through what we call conditioning.
We have a theorem whose proof consists of just veri fying that the function Iliky satisfies the axioms of a possibility measure listed in eqs (1, 2, 3). This technically obvious theorem is important because it establishes a direct link between possibility theory and the central concept in statistics. This relation ship has been noticed for quite some time. The fact that the posterior possibility function calculated from a vacuous prior possibility and a random observation behaves as a likelihood function has been pointed out by Smets [21] if the updating process is required to satisfy certain postulates. Dubois et a!. [6] show that possibility measures can be viewed as the supremum of a family of likelihood functions. Based on that they justify the min combination rule for possibility func tions. We argue further that all relevant information about the unknown parameter that can be obtained from a partially specified probability model and an ob servation is a possibility measure. This view is essen tially Shafer's idea [20] according to which statistical evidence is coded by belief functions whose focal ele ments are nested. This kind of belief function ( conso nant) in its plausibility form is a possibility function. Halpern and Fagin [12] argue for the representation of evidence by a discrete probability function that is obtained by normalizing likelihoods of the singletons so that they sum to unity. However, this probability, Halpern and Fagin concede, should be interpreted in neither frequentist nor subjectivist senses.
The identity of likelihood and possibility can be used in two directions. First, for possibility theory and its application in AI, the link with statistics boosts its rel evance and validity. We argue that unlike the Bayesian approach, which assumes a completely specified distri bution, the possibility function is the result of a par tially specified model (true distribution is unknown but assumed to be in a :F) and an observed data. In other words, we have answered the question which is often raised in discussions: "Where does possibility in formation come from?" One answer is it comes from a partially specified probability model of a phenomenon and experimental observations. The derived possibil ity function encodes all relevant information that can be obtained from the experiment. Second, statistics can also benefit from recently developed techniques in an area that has a different motivation. Traditional problems in statistics may be re-examined in the light of new insights. In the rest of this paper, we study the statistical decision problem from the point of view of qualitative decision theory as described in [10, 11] . Let us review, in terms of likelihood semantics, our proposal for qualitative decision making with possibil ity theory [10, 11] . We assume a situation that includes a set !1 which can be interpreted as the set of hypothe ses or the parameter space. Also assumed is a set of consequences or prizes X that includes one best prize (x) and one worst prize (.:.. ). An action d is a mapping !1-+ X. In other words, the consequence of an action is determined by which hypothesis is true. The set of actions is denoted by A. The uncertainty about hy potheses obtained from the observation is expressed by an extended likelihood function 1r. An action coupled with a uncertainty measure determines a simple lot tery. Each lottery is a mechanism that delivers prizes with associated likelihoods. Formally, a lottery L in duced by 7r and dis a mapping from X - 
(A4) Continuity. For each x; E X there is a s E C c such that x; � s.
(A5) Qualitative monotonicity.
In [10, 11] we prove a representation theorem for the preference relation. 
Multiplication and maximization are extended to pairs as follows (a, /3, /,�are scalar).
where(,= max{a,/} and 1) = max{/3,0
The expression in the right-hand side of eq.(IO) is called the qualitative expected utility of the lottery in the left-hand side. As a result of theorem 2, we can compare the preference of lotteries by looking at their expected utility.
These five axioms were justified on intuitive grounds in [10, 11] . As we argued, the uncertainty information about the unknown parameter resulting from an ex periment is captured by a possibility measure. Thus, the axioms can be justified indirectly in the context of statistical inference problem. However, we think it would be useful to reexamine them directly in terms of likelihood here.
Among the axioms, AI and A3 are standard assump tions about a preference relation.
A2 is an implication of the conditioning operation. Suppose that the unknown parameter e is a vector. We can think, for example, e = ( ! ,a). If /i is the true value, the holder of L is rewarded with simple lottery L; that, in turn, is associated with scalar parameter a that accepts a0,(1),ao,(2),···ao,(r) with likelihoods 11:;1, 11:;2, ... ll:ir where o; is a permuta tion of (I, 2, 3, ... r) . When ao,(j) obtains, the holder is rewarded with prize Xj· We can view this lottery from a different angle. That is Lis a lottery that delivers Xj in case tuple < !;ao,(i) > is the true value of e. Thus, the extended likelihood < /iO"o,(j) > is 7r;.ll:ij since ll:ij is the conditional likelihood on /i. The set of tuples for which Xj is delivered is { < /iao,(j) > II::; i::; k}. The continuity axiom (A4) requires that for any con sequence x E X there is a canonical lottery c = (>.J/x, >.2/!f.) such that x � c. For clarity, let us as sume that x == 1, !f.== 0. For any x E [0, 1], we need to find a canonical lottery c equivalent to x. We pro pose a likelihood gamble for that purpose. By doing so, we provide an operational semantic for the concept of binary utility.
Suppose that random variable Y is generated from one of two normal distributions 2 that have the same stan dard deviation This betting procedure is quite similar to the test used in practice to identify the unary utility of a monetary value. But there are important differences. First, in stead of using a random variable with a known distri bution (e.g., tossing a fair coin or rolling a dice), we use for our test a partially specified model together with a randomly generated observation. We let the deci sion maker bet on a gamble tied to a situation that by nature, is a hypothesis testing problem. The rewards in this gamble are tied not to an observed realization of the random variable as in an ordinary gamble, but instead, the rewards are conditioned on the true value of the parameter underlying the random variable. We just showed that binary utility elicitation is done by betting on a likelihood gamble. We assume that the betting behavior of the decision maker is consistent and rational in some way. figure 2 , it is easy to check the fact that the condition on the right hand of eq. (9) is equivalent to y ::; y'. We want to show that the confidence in favor of J.l == -1 is higher for y than for y' no matter which methods arc used.
For the significance test method applied for testing J.l = 1 against J.l = -1, the p-value for rejecting J.l == 1 in favor of J.l == -1 provided by data y is Pi <=I(Y ::0 y) that is smaller than the p-valuc corresponding to data y' which is Pf '=l (Y ::0 y').
The likelihood reasoning [8] compares the hypotheses by looking at their likelihood ratios. It is obvious that
If the decision maker is Bayesian and assumes the prior probability P(J.L = -1) == p, then (s)he will calculate posterior probabilities
From L iky (-1) 2': Liky'(-1) and Liky(1) ::; Liky' (1), we have P(J.L == -1jy) 2': P(J.L = -1jy'). Let us denote the expected payoffs of the likelihood gambles in two cases Y == y and Y == y' by Vy and Vy'.
We want to invoke one more, in our opinion the most important, justification for A5. This justification is based on the concept of the first order stochastic dom inance (FSD).
Without being a strict Bayesian, we do not assume to know the prior probability of P(J.L == -1). We can model this situation by viewing the prior probability of J.l == -1 as a random variable p taking value in the Exp. payoff Figure 3 : Expected payoffs for two observations unit interval. However, we do not assume to know the distribution of p. We will write the expected payoff of the likelihood gamble by Vy(p). Since it is a function of p, Vy(p) is a random variable. We want to compare two r.v. Vy(p) and Vy'(p).
One of the methods used for comparing random vari ables is based on the concept of stochastic dominance (SD). We are interested in the first degree stochastic dominance (FSD). This concept has been used exten sively in economics, finance, statistics and other ar eas [16] . Suppose X and Y are two distinct random variables with the cumulative distributions F and G respectively. We say that X stochastically dominates (first degree) Y (write XD1Y) iff F(x) :s; G(x) Vx. Since X and Y are distinct, strict inequality must hold for at least one value x. FSD is important because of the following equivalence XD1Y iff E(u(X)) :::: E(u(Y)) VuE U where U the class of non-decreasing utility functions. E( u(X)) is the expected utility of X under utility function u.
Let us consider the relation between Vy (p) and Vy' (p).
We have the following lemma that relates the expected payoffs and the likelihood pairs. The proof is omitted. 
In figure 3 , the lower curve is the graph for V o.6o (p) (at Y = .6 the extended likelihood pair is (.30 1 1, 1.) ) and the upper curve is the graph for Vo.26(P) ( (.5945, 1.) ).
Now, for any v E (0, 1), let us denote the roots of equations Vy (p) = v and Vy' (p) = v by Pv and p� re spectively i.e., Vy(Pv) = v and Vy' (p�) = v. If (>.. , Jt) > ( >..' , Jt1) then by lemma 1 Vy (Pv) > Vy' (Pv). Therefore, Vy' (p�) > Vy' (Pv). Because Vy' (p) is strictly increas ing, we infer Pv < p�.
Since Vy(p) and Vy'(P) are increasing, P(Vy(p) :s; v) = P (p :s; Pv) and P(Vy'(P) :s; v) = P(p :s; p�). Because Pv < p�, P(Vy(p) :s; v) :s; P(Vy'(P) :s; v) . This last inequality means Vy(p) D1 Vy'(p). Thus, we have the following theorem Theorem 3 The order on binary utility is the order oj first degree stochastic dominance.
In summary, we show that there are compelling argu ments justifying the five proposed axioms.
4
A Decision-Theoretic Approach to
Statistical Inference with Likelihood
We will review the decision theoretic approach to sta tistical inference. We assume given the set of alterna tive actions denoted by A, the sample space of Y by Y. A loss L(a, IJ) measures the loss that arises if we take action a and the true value of the parameter is IJ.
A decision rule is a mapping 15 : Y -t A, that is for an observation y the rule recommends an action 15( y ). The risk function of a decision rule 15 at parameter value IJ is defined as
The risk function measures the average loss by adopt ing the rule 15 in case IJ is the true value.
The further use of risk functions depends on how much information we assume is available. For each point in the parameter space, there is a value of risk function. In case no a priori information about parameter exists, Wald [22] advocated the use of minimax rule which minimizes the worst risk that could be attained by a rule.
15* = arg min max R( 15, IJ)
where .6. is the set of decision rules. 15* is called the minimax solution.
If we assume, as the Bayesian school does, the exis tence of a prior distribution of the parameter then the risk could be averaged out to one number called Bayes risk
where p is prior distribution of (). Then the optimal rule is one that minimizes the Bayes risk which is called the Bayes solution.
Wald [22] pointed out the relationship between the two rules. There exists a prior distribution p called "the least favorable" for which Bayes solution is the mini max solution.
In our view, both solution concepts are not entirely satisfactory. Bayes solution is made possible by assum ing the existence of prior distribution, which is often a leap of faith. Although in highly idealized situation, prior probability may be extracted from preference or betting behavior, in practice, there are many factors that violate conditions necessary for such deduction.
We have two problems with Wald's proposal. First, the risk function has no speci a l role for the actually observed data. Thus, Wald's proposal does not respect the principle of conditionality. That violation leads to the second problem of minimax rule. The rule ignores information about the parameter that is obtained from the data. One can argue that the minimax rule is being cautious. But it is, in our opinion, too cautious.
There is information about the parameter () provided by the observed data, namely, likelihood information, that must be utilized in making a decision.
We propose the following solution. For a given y E Y, an extended likelihood function liky is calculated. That allows comparison of actions on the basis of their qualitative expected utilities, or more exactly, utilities of lotteries induced by the actions and the likelihood function. For an action d and an observation y, denote Ld( Y ) the lottery generated. The selected action given observation y is
where sup3 is the operation taking maximum element according to the binary order. Equation (20) also de fines a decision rule in the sense that for each point in the sample space, it gives an action. We call such a decision rule the likelihood solution for obvious reasons.
An Illustrative Example
The following example is adapted from [1] . The manu facturer of small travel clocks which are sold through a chain of department stores agrees to service any clock once only if it fails to operate satisfactorily in the first year of purchase. For any clock, a decision must be made on whether to merely clean it or replace the works, i.e., the set of actions A= { a1 , a2 } where a1 de notes cleaning the clock, and a2 denotes immediately replacing the works.
Let us assume that there are only two possible faults i.e., n = {B1,B2} where ()1 means there is the need for cleaning and ()2 means the clock has been physically damaged and the works need replacement. Utility and loss functions are given in the following [.14/( 1, 1), 1/( 1, 1)] whose qualitative expected util ity QU(La2(y1)) = ( 1, 1 ). Thus, given Yl, we have a2 >-y, a1 i.e., a2 is strictly prefered to a1.
Given observation y2, the extended likelihood function is Liky2(1il) = 1 and Liky2(1i 2 ) = .5. We calculate the qualitative expected utility for a1 is QU( La, (y 2 )) = (1, .5) and for a2 QU(La,( Y2 )) = (1, 1). Thus, a1 >-y2 a2.
Given observation y 3 , the extended likelihood function is Liky2(111) = 1 and Liky2(82) = .2. The qualitatively expected utility for a1 is QU(La, (y 3 )) = ( 1, .25) and for a2 remains QU(La2(y 3 )) = (1, 1). Thus, a1 >-y, a2.
In summary, our approach suggests c55 as the likelihood solution.
Let us make an informal comparison of likelihood so lution with minimax and Bayes solutions. In this ex ample, likelihood solution c55 is different from the min imax solution c58. It is because, as we noted, minimax solution ignores the uncertainty generated by an ob servation while likelihood solution does not. In that sense, likelihood solution is more information efficient.
If the prior probability p(li1) = .7, then the Bayes so lution is c55 the same as the likelihood solution. If prior probability is available, one can argue that Bayes so lution is the optimal one. However, the "optimality" of Bayes solution comes at a cost. The decision maker must possess the prior probability. This condition can be satisfied either at some monetary cost (doing re search, or buying from those who know) or the deci sion maker can just assume some prior distribution. In the latter case, the cost is a compromise of solution optimality. One can extend the concept of Bayes solu tion to include the sensitivity analysis. This certainly helps decision maker by providing a frame of reference. But sensitivity analysis itself does not constitute any basis for knowing the prior probability.
The fact that likelihood solution c55 coincides with Bayes solution that corresponds to a largest interval of prior should not be exaggerated. Different unary binary utility conversions may lead to different likeli hood solution. However, it is important to note that there is a fundamental reason for the agreement. As we have pointed out, the axioms A1 to A5 on which likelihood solution is based, are structurally similar to those in [17] . In that work, Luce and Raiffa used those axioms to justify linear utility concept which ul timately is a basis for Bayes solution. Thus, at a foun dational level, optimality of likelihood solution could be justified in the same way as the optimality for Bayes solution although the two optimality concepts are ob viously different. We argue that the question of which optimality has precedence over the other depends on how much information is available. 6 
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we take the fundamental position that all relevant information about the unknown parameter is captured by the likelihood function. This position is justified on the basis of the Likelihood Principle and various asymptotic optimality properties of the maxi mum likelihood procedure. We show that such a like lihood function is basically a possibility measure.
We re-examine the axioms of our decision theory with possibility calculus in terms of the likelihood seman tics. We provide a betting procedure that determines, for a decision maker, the binary utility of a monetary value. This test justifies the continuity axiom. We also justify the monotonicity axiom A5 in terms of first or der stochastic dominance.
We propose a new likelihood solution to a statistical decision problem. The solution is based on maximiz ing the qualitative expected utility of an action given the likelihood function associated with a point in the sample space. The likelihood solution is sandwiched by Wald's minimax solution on one side and the Bayes solution on the other side. Compared to the minimax solution, the likelihood solution is more information efficient. Compared to the Bayesian solution, the like lihood solution does not require a prior probability dis-
